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Observations on
Mr. Vansittart's Narrative

By
Luke Scrafton

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
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


OBSERVATIONS

ON THE
NARRATIVE
OF

Mr. Vansittart's Narrative.

By LUKE SCRAFTON, Esq;



L O N D O N;

Printed for G. KEARSLEY, at No. 1. in
Ludgate-Street.

[Price One Shilling.]

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
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PREFACE.

MR. Vansittart's friends published, in the year 1764, two volumes in *octavo* in justification of his conduct.

Mr. Vansittart arrived in England, in 1765, and wrote a letter to the court of Directors, signifying, that he should be glad to wait on them: he was received according to the usual form, and told the court he was very ready to give them any information they might desire on the Bengal affairs.

When the ships were all arrived, the court of directors were engaged for seven weeks in the examination of the conduct of the company's servants, in Bengal, and the result was, an unanimous disapprobation on several important points; they therefore declined a conference with Mr. Vansittart, out of a point of delicacy, from having nothing agreeable to say to him.

Mr. Vansittart thought himself injured in this, in consequence of which he published another edition of his justification, and appeared active in an opposition against the pre-

sent directors, which was declared only two days before the last election. I waited on Mr. Vansittart, and endeavoured to dissuade him from engaging in it; but his final answer was, that he had been unworthily treated by the court of directors, and that he would take every opportunity to resent it. I then told him, that he must expect to see his conduct attacked, and that I would publish some observations on his Narrative. A letter appeared the next day in the Public Advertiser, of which I was the penman, and left my name at the printer's. Mr. Vansittart represented to me, that a passage in that letter, which mentioned, large sums stipulated for by private treaty, was generally received as a charge against him, as if obtained for himself, which was an injury done to his private character, and wished I would do him justice in that respect. I told him, I had no such meaning; that I meant the sum of thirty-seven laacks of rupees stipulated for the army and navy, and fifty-three laacks for restitution, the former of which was by private treaty, and out of candour and regard to Mr. Vansittart, wrote an explanation, not a recantation. I then wrote these observations on Mr. Vansittart's Narrative; but being extremely averse to so disagreeable a controversy, I let them lay at the bookseller's; by what accident some of them were dispersed is not necessary to mention here, as I now publish them with my own name.

As to the Observer, which Mr. Vansittart ascribes to me, I never saw, heard or knew of it, until it was advertised, of which that gentleman is now fully convinced.

The injustice Mr. Vansittart ascribes to the directors, with respect to an order sent to stop the payment of the restitution money, for losses sustained in the war against Cossim Ally Cawn, is this: The court of directors could not comprehend upon what principle of justice their arms or influence could be employed to obtain from the Nabob an indemnification for losses sustained in a trade carried on to the oppression of his subjects and against their (the directors) orders; they therefore sent an order to stop the payment of it, that they might make a distinction betwixt a legal and an illegal trade; and I must here observe, that the restitution stipulated for on this occasion, bears no parity with that obtained from Meer Jassir, in 1757, for the losses sustained by the unjust capture of Calcutta, by Surajah Dowlah.

As to the injurious expressions in Mr. Vansittart's pamphlet, I have no further notice to take of them here, as Mr. Vansittart has, in presence of two other gentlemen, acknowledged his error, in ascribing the Observer to me, and that he should not have expressed himself in the terms he has, had he not supposed me the author of that paper: and as to Mr. Holwell's work, it contains nothing but scurrility, and I should be very sorry to disturb his tranquility at his time of life, or do

do any thing that may tend to deprive the world of his future reveries on the Banian religion.

Wherever Mr. Vansittart and I differ in facts, the curious reader may easily satisfy himself by enquiry. There is a dubious passage in Mr. Vansittart's work, which, for my own honour, requires some explanation: it relates to an injury supposed to be done to one Omichund. This man was a very old, rich merchant, of great abilities; he was employed by Mr. Watts, in his negociation with Surajah Dowlah, in 1757, and most notoriously betrayed both parties: he was afterwards instrumental in negotiating the treaty with Meer Jaffir, but insisted on an article being inserted in that treaty, for thirty laacks of rupees for himself, besides various other demands, which would have amounted to near a million sterling, and threatened to reveal our negociation to Surajah Dowlah, if we refused, which would have exposed Mr. Watts, and all the gentlemen dispersed about the country to instant death. To counteract this plotting genius, it was agreed to deceive him by a sham treaty, in which all his demands were inserted; but when the battle of Plassey was over, he was undeceived, and his disappointment brought on his dotage a year or two sooner than it would have come by the course of years. As to any private advantage derived therefrom, by me, or any one else, I know of none; neither do I know of a single transaction in those times that
would


would not stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny.

It is not from little occasional pamphlets that the public are to form their judgement on the transactions in Bengal ; they may expect to see the history of the war in that quarter, by the same able and impartial hand, that has wrote the history of the war in the Carnatic ; until then I would recommend to them to suspend their judgment, or to collect their knowledge from those gentlemen who have served in India.

E R R A T A:

Page 39, line 25, for *have*, read *had*.

Page 42, line 19, for *undetermined*, read *undermined*.



OBSERVATIONS

O N

Mr. Vansittart's Narrative.

I CANNOT enter on my proposed remarks on Mr. Vansittart's three volumes, without first taking a short view of lord Clive's conduct at Bengal.

The certainty we had of Surajah Dowla's intentions to attack us as soon as our fleet and forces should leave the Ganges, urged us to attempt the deposing him, which was soon affected by the battle of Plassey, and Meer Jaffir placed in the subahship, conformably to our part of the treaty between him and the company. He, on his part, promised a vast sum for restitution for losses sustained by the company and individuals, in the capture of Calcutta by Surajah Dowla: he also gave us a tract of land, extending from our settlement to the ocean, and engaged to defray the expences of our troops, whenever we were required to

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march to his assistance, with other articles needless to repeat.

The general idea at this time entertained by the servants of the company was, that the battle of Plassey did only restore us to the same situation we were in before the capture of Calcutta: the subah was conceived to be as independent as ever, and the English returned into their commercial character, with no other alteration in their situation, than a full indemnification for their losses, and a small acquisition of territory, which it was thought might defray the military expences of their garrisons, grown too burthensome to be supported by their trade alone: if the forces were to take the field in support of the subah, it was to be at his expence. These were the mutual conditions; and to strengthen and support the subah, we, in his presence, promised the company's protection to Jaggutseat and Roydullub, for their lives and honour, as long as they remained firm in their allegiance to their master.

It is necessary here to explain who these two persons are.

Jaggutseat was a very great banker, whose ancestors had been long established in Bengal; and during the power of the mogul, used to mediate between the subahs and the court of Delhi, and remit the revenues; he was also mediator between many of the rajahs and the subah, was always highly respected and esteemed; and the late head
of

of that house was supposed to be possessed of many millions sterling: his assistance and support were necessary to the strength and reputation of the government, and our protection was necessary to him, to preserve him against the designs of the government on his wealth.

Roydullub was a Gentoo, or native Indian, who had been in high employment under Surajah Dowla, and was the only one in the secret of Meer Jaffir's engagements with us; and in consequence thereof made very high terms with his master, demanding for himself and his brothers all the highest offices in the state.

These engagements being made, the subah entered into the full and independent exercise of his authority, and lord Clive returned to Calcutta, leaving Mr. Scrafton at the subah's court, to receive the money due from the subah, and in the character of a representative of the company, to make and receive all remonstrances and complaints between the company and their dependents, and the subjects of the subah.

The subah's first object was how to delay or evade the payment of the sums stipulated by treaty with the company, half of which was paid, and the remainder to be discharged in the course of three years. In this important circumstance, Roydullub manifested so evident a partiality to the company, as, together with the exorbitant power lodged in his hands, from the many em-

ployments civil and military, with which he and his family were entrusted, gave rise to a jealousy, which soon produced a crisis; and the subah's forces were on the point of attacking him, when we, finding the subah could not be reconciled to him conformably to our agreement, took him under our protection, and sent him to Calcutta. New circumstances produced another engagement.

The subah, six months after his accession, thought fit to make the tour of his northern provinces, in which lord Clive accompanied him with the English forces. Ramnaran, the governor of Patna, a province in the dominion of the subah, had been very submissive in his letters; but when the subah approached his city, he kept at the head of his troops, and seemed determined to make terms for himself, and sought the English protection. Lord Clive considering the necessity of dividing the French forces, by making a diversion in the Decan, (with which view he had already determined to send the greatest part of the forces to Golconda) saw it would leave us so weak in Bengal, as might tempt the subah to evade the execution of the treaty; a connexion with the Nabob of Patna offered at once a security against this apprehension. Lord Clive therefore determined to support him, and after a long struggle obtained his confirmation from the subah, and engaged to protect him in his government, life, and honour, as long

as he continued true in his allegiance to the subah.

Thus much I thought it necessary to premise, in order to explain the various engagements which lord Clive left to his successors in the government.

Lord Clive quitted India very soon after the defeat of the Dutch by colonel Forde, when our reputation was at the highest, and left an army full three times stronger than that which he commanded the preceding year, with major Caillaud at the head of it, (who had always served with great reputation) and no enemy to contend with but the Shalizada, or emperor's son, the most despicable that had ever appeared against us. The subah's debt to the company was very much reduced, and provinces assigned for the payment of the remainder, which, if faithfully collected, were expected to clear it off entirely within the year, when they were to be restored to the subah, and the company was to return into its old commercial system. And here I shall examine the error which Mr. Vansittart imputes to lord Clive, of not having made sufficient provision for the expences which would be necessarily incurred by our new engagements, which I conceive to be a very unmerited attack on his lordship.

The tenth article of the first treaty with Meer Jaffir, runs thus: "Whenever I demand the English assistance, I will be at the charge of maintaining their troops."

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In consequence of which, when the army took the field, a laack of rupees *per* month was stipulated for the expence, which more than sufficed in lord Clive's time. It did not enter into lord Clive's computation, that his successor should run up the expence to almost double that sum; nor could he, who had defeated the army of Surajah Dowla with three thousand men, conceive the English should ever keep up an army of fifteen thousand! Had lord Clive's maxims of government been followed by his successors, they never could have required it; but they acted on very different principles.

When lord Clive left Bengal, on the 8th of February, 1760, it seems to have been acknowledged by all parties, that there subsisted a perfect friendship between the subah and the English; yet, in August following Mr. Vansittart writes to colonel Caillaud, "The mistrust between the Nabob and our gentlemen seems to me, in a great measure, the cause of all his difficulties and ours." This interval comprehends the time of Mr. Holwell's administration, lord Clive's immediate successor, and leads me to an examination of it.

Colonel Caillaud and the subah's son, Mhiran, took the field against the shahzada, who had entered the province of Bahar, and marched up to Patna, where Ramnaran had suffered a considerable check before our army reached that city. Willing to distinguish himself, he ventured an action with the shahzada,

in which two of the subah's officers turned against him, and pressed so close on him, that he received two wounds, and was only preserved by a battalion of sepoy, and a small detachment of Europeans, who flung themselves between him and the enemy, in which they were almost all cut to pieces; but gave Ramnaran time to make his retreat, and thereby saved the city from falling into the hands of the shahzada.

Our army soon after approached the enemy, who watched their opportunity to attack Mhiran singly, which they effected; Mhiran himself was wounded, and on the moment of defeat, when our sepoy alone, without the battalion once acting, put them to flight: instead, however, of pursuing the enemy, and keeping up their terror, the armies remained at Patna, waiting the young Nabob's recovery.

This halt at Patna gave the enemy time to recover from their alarm, and by a forced march they passed the city of Patna, pushed for the province of Bengal, and in 15 days passed the mountains, and appeared in the province of Beirdwan.

Hence arose the distresses of the subah and the company: the provinces assigned to the company became the seat of war.

The shahzada was suffered to retreat the way he came, and again threatened Patna: armies were every where in motion, the provinces harassed, and the rents withheld; and in the midst of this distress, the young Nabob was

was killed by a flash of lightning; nor were these the only causes of Meer Jaffir's distress.

Throughout the whole of Mr. Holwell's government we may trace the design of a revolution, upon the bare examination of what he thought fit to publish. The 11th of March, 1760, a month after lord Clive's departure, Mr. Holwell, in a letter to Mr. Caillaud, says*, (p. 21.) " We must however support
" him and his government, as long as we pos-
" sibly can without involving ourselves and
" employers in his ruin: when this appears;
" it will be time to think a little farther, as I
" judge there is no treaty between us can exact
" that sacrifice." The 21st of March he writes again in the same strain to Mr. Hastings at the subah's court, (p. 22.) " I think it will
" behove us to guard against our being invol-
" ved in the same ruin;" and in the same letter he accuses the subah of engaging in a separate correspondence with the shahzada.

The 22d, (p. 24.) in the instructions to captain Spears, (the commanding officer of a detachment, going on the subah's service) he writes, " You are not only ever to be on your
" guard against the enemy, but also against
" the treachery of the subah himself; for
" which precaution I have my particular rea-
" sons."

The 7th of April he comes nearer to the point, in the following letter, (p. 31.)

" To

* Vide Holwell's Vindication, published for Becket in 1760.

“ To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

“ *Fort William, April 7, 1760.*

“ SIR, I am now forced to touch upon a
 “ subject, which appears to me to require
 “ our greatest attention. Some days ago I
 “ wrote to Mr. Hastings, concerning an in-
 “ formation which was given, that the old
 “ Nabob had sent a trusty person with a sub-
 “ missive *arzgee to the shahzada, in which
 “ he exculpated himself, by throwing the
 “ whole blame of the opposition made to his
 “ arms on the machinations of the English.
 “ Mr. Hastings, in his letter, in answer to
 “ mine, seemed to think it impossible such a
 “ step could have been taken by the Nabob;
 “ or indeed that he could have sent any arz-
 “ gee at all: however, in a subsequent letter
 “ from him, of the 27th, he finds out that
 “ an arzgee was sent, though different in
 “ purport to that I informed him of. As I
 “ thought it most essential to us to trace, if
 “ possible, the truth, I employed an emissary
 “ to Comgaar Khan†, the consequence of
 “ which has been a phirmaund from the
 “ shahzada, inclosing a copy of the old Na-
 “ bob's arzgee to him, with an apology for
 “ not sending the original. A copy of the
 “ copy I send you inclosed, and request your
 “ sentiments, how and in what light this ap-
 “ pears to you. If the copy is authentic, the
 “ case is plain, that this man for whom we

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“ have

* Addressee to Superiors are called Arzgees or Petitions.

† The Prince's chief ally, a Rajah of a large country, tributary to Bengal.

“ have drawn the sword would not scruple,
 “ if drove to any extremity, to make a sacri-
 “ fice of his protectors. The phirmaund, I
 “ suppose, differs little in matter from that
 “ he* sent you: he reminds me of the obli-
 “ gations the English lay under to his ances-
 “ tors, and offers a *carte blanche* for the com-
 “ pany, provided we will draw our forces off
 “ from that doer of evil, and join them to
 “ his standard, which he advises me he has at
 “ present fixed at Seegur, and, in a few days
 “ after, purposes to erect it in Morshadabad.”

This proves that Mr. Holwell was carrying
 on a correspondence with the shahzada at the
 very time our forces were acting against him
 in the field, at the very time he is imputing it
 as a crime to the subah, that he is engaged in
 the like correspondence. His own correspon-
 dence he acknowledges; but that of the subah
 is attended with no such proof: for the fol-
 lowing is an extract of the answer from colonel
 Caillaud, (p. 34.)

To the Hon. J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq;
 President and Governor of FORT
 WILLIAM.

Camp at Dignagar, April 15, 1760.

SIR, In order to come at the truth, with
 regard to the Nabob's arzgee to the prince,
 Mr. Hastings had recourse to the Nabob's
 Persian writer, a man who hath, on many
 occasions, given him proofs of attachment

and
 *Major Caillaud denies the receiving any Phirmaund
 from the Prince.

“ and fidelity. The moment he set his eyes
 “ on the paper, he declared it to be a forgery.
 “ May I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Hast-
 “ ings for the reason he gave for it; as that
 “ gentleman’s knowledge in the language will
 “ enable him to give you a clearer idea of
 “ these distinctions in the address and style of
 “ their letters than I can pretend to. For my
 “ part, I own, after Mr. Hastings had re-
 “ peated them to me, they were so satisfactory
 “ as to convince me, the probability of its
 “ being a forgery was greatly in the Nabob’s
 “ favour.”

The 24th of April, Mr. Holwell, (p. 38.)
 informs colonel Caillaud, that his own hir-
 karrahs, or messengers, returning from the
 shahzada with dispatches from him, are stop-
 ped and plundered of the letters. What these
 dispatches were, cannot now be known; but
 they probably put an immediate end to all con-
 fidence between the subah and the English,
 and left the former convinced that a revolution
 was then intended; and on the 24th of May
 Mr. Holwell puts the question more plainly
 to Mr. Caillaud, in the following letter,
 (p. 51.)

“ Hitherto our conduct in supporting the
 “ subah’s government can hardly be vindi-
 “ cated to our employers, the more especially
 “ since his flagrant known breach of the trea-
 “ ty last year; not only by his invitation of
 “ the Dutch forces from Batavia, but by his
 “ shameful and insincere conduct and dealing
 “ with us after their arrival, and to this hour,

“ respecting that people. The weakness and
 “ inconsistency of his whole politics, during
 “ the course of this campaign, joined to the
 “ repeated cruelties, murders, and oppressions
 “ daily committed by him or his son on indi-
 “ viduals; the universal detestation of his go-
 “ vernment throughout the provinces; the
 “ obvious certainty of these troubles in the
 “ country continuing without interruption,
 “ whilst this family exists at the head of it;
 “ all these, with many other considerations
 “ which I could enumerate, demonstrate we
 “ cannot longer, consistent with what we owe
 “ to the company, to natural justice and pro-
 “ priety, and to the English name, support a
 “ system of usurpation and tyranny which
 “ reflects dishonour on it, and must, if per-
 “ sisted in, involve our honourable employers
 “ and our colony in a speedy ruin.”

The following was the answer he received
 from the colonel to that letter. (p. 52.)

“ Bad as the man may be whose cause we
 “ now support, I cannot be of opinion that we
 “ can get rid of him for a better, without
 “ running the risk of much greater inconve-
 “ niences, attending on such a change, than
 “ those we now labour under. I presume the
 “ establishing tranquility in these provinces
 “ would restore to us all the advantages of
 “ trade we would wish, for the profit and ho-
 “ nour of our employers; and I think we
 “ bid fairer to bring that tranquility about by
 “ our present influence over the subah, and
 “ by supporting him, than by any change
 “ that

“ that can be made. No new revolution can
 “ take place without a certainty of troubles ;
 “ and a revolution will certainly be the con-
 “ sequence, whenever we withdraw our pro-
 “ tection from the subah ; we cannot in pru-
 “ dence neither, I believe, leave this resolu-
 “ tion to chance ;—we must, in some degree,
 “ be instrumental in bringing it about. In
 “ such a case, it is not impossible we raise a
 “ man to the dignity, just as unfit to govern,
 “ as little to be depended upon, and in short
 “ as great a rogue as our Nabob ; but perhaps
 “ not so great a coward, nor so great a fool,
 “ and of consequence much more difficult to
 “ manage. As to the injustice of supporting
 “ this man, on account of his cruelties, op-
 “ pressions, and his being detested in his go-
 “ vernment, I see so little chance in this blessed
 “ country, of finding a man endued with the
 “ opposite virtues, that I think we may put up
 “ with these vices with which we have no con-
 “ cern, if in other matters we find him fittest
 “ for our purposes,

“ As to his breach of treaty by introducing
 “ the Dutch last year, that was never so clear-
 “ ly proved, I believe, but to admit of some
 “ doubt. Colonel Clive, before he left the
 “ country, seemed satisfied that what was
 “ suspicious in his conduct in that affair, pro-
 “ ceeded not from actual guilt, but from the
 “ timidity of his nature. But if we still
 “ suspect him from further circumstances, we
 “ always have it in our power to put it to the
 “ test

“ test at once, by making him act as he
“ ought.

“ The rains will give us time to negotiate,
“ to see we go on sure grounds, and make
“ such a plan of alliance as will do us honour,
“ and be an advantage to our country and our
“ employers; but let us not abandon the Na-
“ bob, &c. &c.”

July 1, in a letter to Mr. Amyatt, (p. 65.) Mr. Holwell invents a new calumny against the subah, still more improbable than any, *viz.*

“ That he is negotiating for twenty-five thousand Mahrattas to enter his country.”

I have been obliged to be rather prolix in this account of Mr. Holwell's political conduct, that the reader may understand from whence arose that want of confidence which Mr. Vansittart complained of, and the distress in which the provinces were involved, when Mr. Vansittart took the government, the end of July, 1760; soon after which Mr. Holwell delivered to Mr. Vansittart the following memorial.

A SHORT

A SHORT space fully proved how unworthy the family thus raised to the subahship were: the conditions of the treaty could not be obtained from the subah without in a manner being extorted from him, by a thousand shifts and evasions; it was plain no single article would ever have been complied with, had the subah been vested with sufficient power to prevent it, or could he have divested himself of his own fears and apprehensions from our resentment. Tunka's on the lands were however granted for payment of the stipulated sums at stated times, by which the Roy Royen, or collector of the revenues, and the Dewans, Mat-

THE sense of these two charges is no more than this: That the subah would willingly have evaded paying a million sterling; but finding colonel Clive was not to be intimidated, he faithfully complied with his treaty, by assigning the revenues of three provinces for the payment of the sums due.

foodies, &c. dependants of that office, with every harpy employed in the Zemindary or lands, became our implacable enemies, and consequently a party was soon raised at the Durbar, headed by the subah's son Mhiran and Raja Raag Bullob, who were daily planning schemes to shake off their dependance on the English, and continually urging to the subah, that until this was effected, his government was nominal only. The subah, something irritated by our protection of Raja Doolubram, (better known by the name of Roy-Doolub) and weak and irresolute in himself, fell too soon into these sentiments.

The first step taken to accomplish this scheme of independence, was to assassinate and cut off, un-

This is without the least foundation.

This is so very far from being true, that this Rajabullob did about this time, propose to colonel Clive the deposing Meer Jaffir, in favour of Surajah Dowla's brother. The interpreter to this proposal was the author.

The men here said to be put to death for their attachment to us, had no sort of connexion with us. Coja Hadee was,

der one pretence or another, every minister and officer at the Durbar, who they knew were attached to the English. To this purpose Coja Hadee, and Cossim Ali Khan first and second Buxy, were assassinated in November and December, 1758.

was, a month or two before his death, engaged in a project to introduce the French, which was detected by the seizing of his agent, one Mustapha, on his way to M. Bussy, commander of the French forces in Golconda, which Mustapha was thrown into prison as a spy, where he remained many months, but afterward became one of Mr. Vansittart's agents for his inland trade. The real cause of the subah's displeasure was, that they, together with eleven others, set their hands to an agreement mutually to support each other; which paper was betrayed to the subah by Ramnaran.

After many attempts made on the persons of Rheim Khan and Golam Shaw, his uncle and brother, they were at last obliged to seek an asylum with the Shahzada, 1759.

This is void of all truth. Golam Shaw was no relation of the subah; they were both officers in his service, and revolted to the Shahzada.

Roy Doolub's son and four brothers were proscribed, for no other cause but his own inviolable attachment to us: this family would have fallen a sacrifice, had they not been rescued out of the subah's hands by force of arms. Om-hir Beg Khan would, from the same cause, have suffered the same fate, had he not given his solemn engagement to quit the kingdom, which he accordingly did, in a miserable state of health, and lived only to arrive at Bufforah.

The next project of the Durbar appear'd by every subsequent concurring circumstance to be a secret negotiation with the Dutch for transporting troops from Batavia into these provinces, that with their united force a stop might be put to the power of the En-

This proscription was nothing more than dismissing them from their employments, and they are all alive at this time.

This man quitted the country because he had no confidence in any one but lord Clive, and died only last year at Bufforah.

The whole of this charge amounts to no more than a suspicion, that at the time when there subsisted a jealousy between Meer Jaffir and the English, on account of the protection we gave to Ramnaran, the subah may have expressed a desire to see two European powers in his country, that he might oppose them to the English.

lish. This scheme was conducted by Raja Raage Bullob, on the part of the subah, and by Fookre Toojar (better known by the name of Coja Wazeed) on the part of the Dutch, about October or November, 1758, in the period when the Decan expedition took place, under colonel Forde, and your garrisons much reduced.

Soon after, the provinces were invaded by the shahzada, (undoubted heir to the mogul empire) on the side of Patna; and colonel Clive, with the English troops and sepoy joined the subah and his army, and by forced marches preserved Rajah Ramnaran (Nabob of Patna) steady in his duty, and arrived just in time to save that city and province, and

each other, and preserve the ballance of power in his own hands. This is but conjecture, unattended with any proof; but when they did arrive, he acted the most honourable part that was possible: he sent lord Clive twelve covers of letters addressed to the governor of the next province, under his sign and seal, and told him to employ his forces and authority to what purpose he pleased; and when the Dutch commenced hostilities, he sent his son with a body of forces to join us.

drive the prince beyond the river Karamnassa, and brought the Budgepoore, &c. countries under subjection.

The prince more than once wrote to the colonel, offering any terms for the company and himself on condition the English would quit the subah and join his arms: but the colonel thinking it incompatible with our treaty of alliance, gave the prince no encouragement.

At the end of the campaign, in June, 1759, the colonel returned to us, and about the same time the subah and young Nabob Mhiran arrived at Muxadabad, both now with full conviction of our firm attachment to his government and family, and of our religious regard to treaties. What sense they retained of these ob-

Lord Clive's rule of conduct was a rigid observance of all engagements.

ligations,

ligations, and how long will appear by and by.

The subah and his son thinking themselves now better established in the government, and screened by such a powerful support as our arms, set no bounds to their cruelties, oppressions and exactions from those who had any thing to be plundered of, and these barely received a check from the frequent and severe remonstrances of colonel Clive to the subah, on a conduct which he foretold him must, from the general detestation of his people, end in the destruction of himself, his family, and country; his troops clamorous for their pay, whilst the subah, in place of appropriating the sums he had acquired by repeated assassinations

This being a general charge, I can only say, it is in general false: the situation in which the subah was, with respect to his forces being mutinous and clamorous for their pay, is no more than is common to almost all the Nabobs of India. I have already taken up two of the instances of cruelty with which Mr. Holwell has charged the subah; and I shall here take up the rest of the catalogue of murders ascribed to him by Mr. Holwell and Mr. Vansittart.

The widow of Surajah Dowla's uncle.

The mother of Surajah Dowla.

The adopted son of Surajah Dowla's uncle.

The widow of Surajah Dowla.

The infant daughter of Surajah Dowla.

to the just demands of his Jammautdars and troops, lavished the same in boundless extravagancies.

The head spy and the surveyor of the public works.

The story of the murder of the women and children was calculated to affect the passions, to remove every scruple from the minds of those Mr. Holwell was endeavouring to bring over to his views; he accordingly writes to Mr. Hastings, (p. 46.)

“ These are the acts
“ of the tyger we are
“ supporting and fight-
“ ing for.”

Mr. Hastings concludes his reply in these words. “ If this charge
“ against him is true,
“ no argument can ex-
“ cuse or palliate so a-
“ trocious and compli-
“ cated a villainy, nor
“ (forgive me, sir, if
“ I add) our support-
“ ing such a tyrant.”

For my own part, when I read this long and bloody list, I conjectured that the phir-
maunds stopped by the
su-

subah, had confirmed him in his opinion, that a resolution was taken to depose him, and (he suspected) in favour of one of this old family; and therefore, as most Eastern princes usually do, he had destroyed them: but my conjectures were needless; for I now give the words of lord Clive, in a letter by the Grenville.

“ I desire it may be
 “ known, for the ho-
 “ nour of Jaffir Ally
 “ Kawn, that the mur-
 “ ders ascribed to him
 “ in Mr. Holwell’s me-
 “ morial, (p. 46.) are
 “ cruel aspersions void
 “ of all truth; for
 “ they are all now liv-
 “ ing except the two
 “ last, who were put
 “ to death by Mhiran,
 “ unknown to his fa-
 “ ther.” *

To put this matter beyond all doubt, I have obtained copies of the under-written papers.

* Extract of a letter from lord Clive to the court of directors, per Grenville.

TRANSLATION *of an ADDRESS to Lord*
CLIVE, *received December 10, 1765.*

WE Moraud-ul-Dowlah, son of Jeeram-ul-Dowlah, with my two sisters Sheeruff ul-nissa, wife of Aliverdy Cawn, with the wife and daughter of Serage-ul-Dowlah, Shooka-bolla Cawn, Husfuz Alla Cawn, Meerzay, &c. sons of Sirferaz Cawn, with our three sisters, Jessarut Jung Mirza Jubba, &c. sons of Soulah Jung, with our mother and one sister.

By our ill fortune former rulers have, for a long time past, kept us, innocent people, imprisoned at Dacca, and we did not receive regularly even the slender sustenance which was allowed us. By the hardships of imprisonment and our distress for food and necessaries, our life was rendered bitter to us. When the Nabob Maun-un-Dowlah Bahadre Muzzufur Jung came to Dacca, he paid us our small allowance regularly, month by month. Now that your lordship, out of your great kindness, has released us from our confinement, we are arrived safe at Moorshidabad. For the rest of our lives, receiving an allowance from the Sir-car and furnishing ourselves with necessaries, we shall be constantly employed in praying for the perpetuity of your prosperity and glory,
and

and shall never be guilty of any improper action contrary to your pleasure.

Under the seal of

Seif-ul-dun Mahomed-Cawn

Mahomed Mogloo

Mooly Begum

Moraud-ul Dowlah

Shooka bolla Cawn

Shereef-ul-nissa Begum

Lulf ul-nissa Begum

Mahomed Huffuz Olla Cawn Br.

Iyeval Begum, daughter of Ullauv-ul-Dowlah

Nussur-ul-dun Mahomed Cawn

Aboo Tiraub Cawn

Ausun-ul dun Mahomed Cawn Br.

Monfinna Begum, daughter of Ullaur-ul-Dowlah

Mahun-Begum

Lauralu Begum, daughter of Ullauv-ul Dowlah

Jessaruk Jung

Zeitazaud-ul Dowlah

Mahomet Toulah, son of Soulut Jung

COPY of the POSTSCRIPT of a LETTER
from Mr. SYKES, dated Nov. 1765.

SINCE writing the above, Marada Dowlah, Agahbabah, with many other persons of quality, who have been so long prisoners at Dacca, waited on me this morning, when they expressed their gratitude for the part his lordship had so generously taken in their favour, by procuring their release, an act they little expected, tho' without fault. They requested I would assure your lordship, &c. that they

E

would

would ever retain the greatest sense for so great an obligation, and desired I would forward the enclosed letter to you as soon as possible.

The rest of this memorial needs no comment, but here I shall observe that most of what Mr. Holwell has published, is entitled to equal credit with this memorial.

The next period I shall consider is the state of affairs from Mr. Vansittart's arrival to the dissensions which broke out between him and his council. It appears, that the company's agents requested the subah to send his son-in-law, Meer Cossim, to Calcutta, to consult with them on the measures to be taken for the general good, and to regulate the operations of the future campaign, which the subah (probably acquiring fresh confidence from the change in our government) immediately consented to, and he arrived at Calcutta the 20th of September. Mr. Holwell's account of this affair shews, that he so compleatly debauched him from his allegiance to his prince and father-in-law, that on his first conference he dared to propose the *murder of Meer Jaffir to him, nevertheless the treaty was concluded the same day.

Meer Cossim returned to Muxadabad, and soon after governor Vansittart followed him, un-

* Vide Holwell's Vindication, published for Becket, 1760, the following words---“ closing this introduction
“ with saying, that the Subah was incapable of govern-
“ ment; that no faith or trust could be put in him; and
“ that if he was not taken off, it would never be in his
“ power to render the company those services which he
“ had so much at heart.”

under pretence of paying his first visit to the subah, and on the same day Mr. Holwell resigned the service. The treaty was at this time a profound secret to the absent members of the committee, and to the members of the council who were not of the committee; by whom, as well as by the whole settlement, it was understood, that Mr. Vansittart was going to remove some of the subah's ministers, and to consult with him on the means of restoring his affairs. I now set in opposition to Mr. Vansittart's account of the revolution, what was published in 1764, signed by colonel Coote, P. Amyatt, John Carnac, Wm. Ellis, Stanlake Batson, and Harry Verelst.

“ At a time when there was not the least
 “ appearance of a rupture or disgust between
 “ us and the Nabob, Jaffer Aly Cawn, on the
 “ contrary a friendship and harmony subsisted,
 “ Meer Cossim Chan, his son-in-law, came
 “ down to Calcutta, on some pretence or other,
 “ to visit Mr. Vansittart; and having stayed a
 “ short time, returned to Moorshadabad on
 “ the pretence of a visit to the Nabob. Co-
 “ lonel Caillaud, with a party of two hundred
 “ Europeans and some sepoy, attended him,
 “ who (to remove the suspicion which such a
 “ force would necessarily have occasioned) it
 “ was pretended were going up to Patna to
 “ reinforce the army there. When Mr. Van-
 “ sittart arrived at Moradbaug, the Nabob paid
 “ him two visits, at the last of which Mr. Van-
 “ sittart, without any previous notice of his
 “ intentions, gave him three letters, mentioned

"in the consultation of the 10th of Novem-
 ber 1760, of which copies have been trans-
 mitted you. The abruptness which these with-
 letters were presented him, one close upon
 the other, and the unexpected proposals con-
 tained in them, terrified the Nabob, and he
 was entirely at a loss how to act, but desired
 time to consider on what was to be done.
 Mr. Vansittart seeing his perplexity, strongly
 insisted on his naming some person from a-
 among his relations to take charge of the
 subahship, and very particularly recom-
 mended Cossim Aly Chan, who was sent
 for, and the Nabob was desired to stay till
 she came; but Cossim Aly Chan delayed so
 long, and the Nabob was in such anxiety of
 mind, and so desirous to be released from
 the visit, being greatly fatigued, that Mr.
 Vansittart was obliged, in order to save ap-
 pearances, to suffer his departure to the pa-
 lace, after having detained him much longer
 than his inclination. That night and the day
 following passed in concerting measures with
 Cossim Aly Chan, how to put in execution
 the plan before agreed on in Calcutta; a
 treaty having been signed for this purpose
 in September, 1760, while Cossim Aly Chan
 was down there. In consequence of these
 deliberations our troops clandestinely crossed
 the river the next night, under col. Caillaud,
 and being joined by Cossim Aly Chan and
 his party, surrounded the Nabob's palace.
 A letter from Mr. Vansittart was sent in,
 demanding his immediate compliance with
 " what

“ what had been proposed to him ; to which
 “ the Nabob returned for answer, that such
 “ usage was what he never expected from the
 “ English ; that whilst a force was at his gates
 “ he would enter into no terms, and that it
 “ was his desire our troops might be returned
 “ to Moradbaug. A message was then sent,
 “ informing the Nabob, that, if he did not
 “ directly comply, they should be obliged to
 “ storm the palace. Terrified and astonished
 “ by this menace, he opened the gates, ex-
 “ claiming that the English were guilty of
 “ perjury and breach of faith, that had he
 “ perceived their designs against his govern-
 “ ment, he had friends enough to hazard at least
 “ one battle in his defence ; but altho’ no oaths
 “ were sacred enough to bind the English ; yet,
 “ as he had sworn to be their faithful friend, he
 “ would never swerve from his engagement,
 “ and rather suffer death, than draw his sword
 “ against them. So suspicious was he of be-
 “ ing sold, that he desired to know what sum
 “ of money Cossim Aly Chan was to give for
 “ the subahship, and he would give half as
 “ much more, to be continued ; he hoped,
 “ however, if they intended to dethrone him,
 “ they would not leave him to the mercy of
 “ his son-in-law, from whom he feared the
 “ worst, but rather wished they would carry
 “ him from the city, and give him a place of
 “ safety in Calcutta. This last request of the
 “ Nabob’s, the effect of his fear and despair,
 “ was immediately laid hold of, and construed
 “ into the light of a voluntary resignation : ac-
 “ cordingly

“ cordingly our troops took possession of the
 “ palace; Meer Cossim Chan was raised to the
 “ Musnud, and the old Nabob was hurried
 “ into a boat, with a few of his women and
 “ necessaries, and sent away to Calcutta, in a
 “ manner wholly unworthy of the high rank
 “ he so lately held, as is also the scanty sub-
 “ sistance allowed him there by his successor.”

“ Thus was Jaffir Aly Chan deposed, in
 “ breach of a treaty founded on the most so-
 “ lemn oaths, and in violation of the national
 “ faith; a prince of whose friendship and at-
 “ tachment you have had many signal proofs,
 “ in whose cause our arms have with much
 “ honour been employed, and by a firm adhe-
 “ rence to whom the English had acquired
 “ throughout the whole country so universal a
 “ character of fidelity and constancy, that the
 “ most perfect confidence was placed by the
 “ natives in them.”

Such was the revolution adopted by Mr. Van-
 sittart at the instigation of Mr. Holwell.

Whoever will candidly examine the whole
 of this proceeding, will, I believe, acknowledge
 with me, that the members of the committee
 and council who were not consulted, could
 never forgive a man, who had thus deceived
 them into a revolution they could not approve
 of; they were persuaded too it was for corrupt
 purposes, for tho' the obligation for the twenty
 laack was returned, it was left open to a future
 claim, as appears by Mr. Holwell's account of
 the speech he made when this present was re-
 fased

fused*. “ That we were labouring for the
 “ peace and safety of country only, and could
 “ not in honour receive the offer; but that,
 “ when the country was settled, the compa-
 “ ny’s debt paid off, and the arrears paid to
 “ his troops, if he then thought there was
 “ aught due from him, he was at liberty to
 “ gratify his friends in what manner he
 “ pleased.†”

Nor was this the only ground of their sus-
 picion: the chief author of that revolution left
 the country soon after, with a fortune acquired
 in a government of a few months; and there is
 now in the hands of the court of directors a
 copy of an acknowledgment, under his hand,
 of his receipt of considerable sums of money
 for services rendered by him to Cossim Aly
 Chan. Mr. Vansittart, who arrived but a few
 months before, and was universally well recei-
 ved, by this revolution, and the manner in
 which it was conducted, lost at once the con-
 fidence of his council.

I come now to the consideration of Mr. Van-
 sittart’s administration after the revolution was
 effected.

Major Carnac, by his active conduct in a few
 days defeated the shahzada, (now king by the
 death of his father) who delivered himself up
 to the major, together with Mont. Law and his
 party, by which the war was brought to an end,
 and with it vanished all the distresses of the
 govern-

* Vide Publication for Becket.

† Vide, p. 23. Holwell’s refutation, published for Becket
 1764.

government and of the company; and the council justly urged the like success would have had the same effect under Meer Jaffir as under Meer Cossim.

The first object of contention with the Subah was Ramnaran, the Nabob of Patna, whose services and attachment to the English are fully acknowledged in Mr. Vansittart's Narrative, p. 191. Meer Cossim had too much penetration not to discern the views which influenced col. Clive to take this man into his protection: he saw clearly he was meant as a check on his predecessor, and would be so to him if he could not effect his removal. The pretence for removing him was his refusing to account for the revenues of his provinces: how just the charge was I am no judge; I can only say, the author accompanied lord Clive in the expedition in 1759, and no such charge was then urged against him. Mr. Vansittart takes great pains to represent col. Coote as willing to screen Ramnaran from the Nabob's just demands but it does not appear to me in that light; in Mr. Vansittart's first vol. p. 202. The subah acknowledges col. Coote told him, " he might make a search into his accounts, " and if he was convicted of misconduct, and " the council's order should authorize it, he " should be dismissed:" again to the same effect, p. 210; but, in fact, the Nabob was determined to have him given up to him, and was as unwilling to settle accounts with him as he was to have them settled. This col. Coote saw, but was unable to follow the subah through

through all his subtleties, and by the art of the people about him, was sometimes provoked to acts of passion, and his mind embittered by the mortifying reflection that the subah's intrigues would certainly prevail, and this man, who had been so faithful and useful an ally to us would be delivered up to him.

The whole of this negotiation is a fine picture of an eastern politician, working to his end by every act of bribery, menacing, and soothing, conducted with the utmost command of temper: he at last prevailed, Ramnaran's person was put in his power, and his government given to a man devoted to the subah; Ramnaran was put in irons, and he was held out to his subjects *in terrorem*, to teach them what those must expect who should seek protection of the English against his power; and agreeable to the prediction of the council he was afterwards murdered.

I shall only make this reflection, that whatever displeasure his conduct might have given to the subah, a regard for our own engagements should have afforded his person protection, as in the example lord Clive gave in the affair of Roydullub, to whom our protection had been faithfully promised, and who is now alive.

From the giving up of Ramnaran, in July, 1761, to Mr. Hastings's departure to the subah in March, 1762, the subah seems employed in establishing his power in the province of Bahar, in forming his army, in regulating his forces, and in that period no very material disputes happened. Mr. Vansittart

indeed laid much stress on some actions of Mr. Ellis, which he ascribes to a settled design in the latter to effect a rupture whenever he could, which is a motive he openly or tacitly ascribes to his opponents throughout his whole work. The actions with which he charges Mr. Ellis are, the having seized one of the custom officers for interrupting the company's trade, and the demanding the deserters.

With respect to the seizing the custom officer, it turns solely on the fact, whether he treated our pass with contempt or not. The doing ourselves justice in matters of phirmaund, privilege was a power we always exercised: I remember a multitude of instances in former times, and often practised it after Meer Jaffir's accession, without any complaint from him or from any superiors.

The demanding the deserters, supposing the fact true that there were deserters, was very justifiable; and if the subah would persevere in not trusting a single man to go into the fort to search, Mr. Ellis was equally right not to withdraw his sepoy; the subah's people representing this as an attack on the fort of Mongheer, shewed them as prone to urge on a rupture as the subah pretended Mr. Ellis to be; tho' I declare I see no part of Mr. Ellis's conduct in that light hitherto. His letter to Mr. Hastings, 17th May, 1762, is to me a clear proof he had no such intention, and the subah's refusal of his visit, and not answering his letter, shewed at least the same bitterness on his part.

He, in the mean time, was ruining every man, who had ever shewed any attachment to the English; the door was opened to these jealousies by one of the first actions of Mr. Vansittart's administration. The reader will remember, that lord Clive left an agent at the subah's court, whose business it was to make and receive all complaints, and to have a constant eye to every thing that was going forward. This was a privilege we always preserved; in former times a native was our agent, but after the battle of Plassey an Englishman resided in this capacity; him, Mr. Vansittart* withdrew soon after his arrival, and the Nabob was suffered to continue at the extremity of his dominions, without any body to inform us of his motions. By this every trifling complaint, report or jealousy had time to take deeper root, and reports of many kinds prevailed uncontradicted; the governor being by this the sole channel of communication between the subah and the English.†

The little harmony which now subsisted between the subah and the English, induced the company's agent at Calcutta to depute Mr.

F 2 Warren

* I impute this to Mr. Vansittart, because the council generally acquiesce in all proposals the president makes, with respect to the conduct of political affairs.

† The Armenians fed the Subah's jealousy, by continual reporting to him the private discourses that passed in Calcutta to his disadvantage; and the alarm was kept up in Calcutta, by the accounts constantly received of the progress the Subah was making in forming an army, disciplining Sepoys on our plan, and constructing field pieces with an intention to break with us.

Warren Hastings, a member of the council to the subah. The reason assigned was, to remove the uneasiness and jealousy, which the subah's conduct indicated, and to prevent the bad effects which might arise from a want of confidence; a very clear proof that at this time the council did not mean a revolution; this deputation was ordered in March, 1762, and Mr. Amyatt's party took this opportunity to demand the twenty laacks, for which the Nabob had given his bond when the treaty was made with him, and they suspected was actually received, seeing that the manner in which it was first refused, left it open to a future claim. (vide p. 22.)

They never meant to persist in the demand, but took this and every other occasion to shew that their mistrust and resentment to the governor were as strong as ever.

I come now to speak one of the real causes of the war, I mean the trade carried on by the Servants of the company, in salt, beetle-nut, tobacco, and other articles of inland consumption, which I shall treat of each distinctly by itself.

The words of the Phirmaund are: "What-ever goods or merchandise their agents may bring or carry, by land or by water, in the ports, quarters, or borders of the province, know them to be custom free."

It is such an absurdity to suppose that the court of Delhi's granting permission to a foreign nation, coming by sea to trade with their subjects, could mean a trade in the consumption

tion of the country from one province to another, or in other words, a monopoly of all the necessaries of life over their own subjects, that I will not lose time and words in arguing upon it, but shall declare it was a construction never thought on in the author's time. There was a time when our fleets to Patna used to be escorted by a considerable force, to guard against a set of pirates who infested the Ganges; and under pretence of carrying provisions for soldiers, and because they were too strong to be forcibly searched, used to carry salt. It was at first winked at by the government, but not long; for about the year 1744, it was made a pretence for a demand on the company, who dismissed some of their agents for it, and positively forbid it; and I believe there was no other instance of it until after the battle of Plassey, when the author being resident at the Nabob's court, received a complaint, that Mr. Verelst carried on such a trade; on which he applied to lord Clive and the principal agents of the company, who gave it as their opinion, "That the English had acquired no one additional privilege in trade by our treaty with Meer Jaffir." The author wrote this to Mr. Verelst, and heard no more complaints of him. His successor at the subah's court entertained the same opinion; yet we find it was soon after given into. There is a passage in Mr. Hastings's *letter which implies that lord Clive was concerned in this trade, which is absolutely false; and I am persuaded he never gave a pass (unless de-

* Vide Mr. Vansittart's 1st vol. p. 27.

deceived into it) but for the regular articles of export and import, according to the practice of former governors.

The first claim of this trade, as matter of right, was in Mr. Holwell's letter to Mr. Hastings, dated February 11, 1760*, probably the first letter he wrote after lord Clive left the government: he therein desires to know, why the English should not trade in salt, beetle-nut, and tobacco? What Mr. Hastings's answer was, I know not; what it should have been, I well know: he should have represented it as a violation of the Phirmaund, as well as of the company's orders, and incompatible with the peace of the country: he should have wrote so to the governor and council, and have quitted the subah's court, if they persisted in it.

From this time it appears to me to have been generally given into: for after the superiors had set the example, it is not probable their inferiors were long in following it. The distracted state of the country, after the shahzada entered Bengal, took off the subah's attention to it; nor had he complained, was there much prospect of redress.

The first part of Meer Cossim's reign was taken up with military operations, and the regulation of the province of Bahar: but when he had reduced that entirely under his power, increased his military force, and began to feel his strength, he seems to have taken the resolution to check the encroachments of the English trade. He found his revenue affected by it,

* Ibid. p. 31.

it, his authority trampled upon by the uncontrollable power exercised by the English agents all over the country, and, in short, all those evil consequences which he so well describes in his letter to the governor, of May 1762, vol. ii. page 97; or, without referring to that, we will take Meer Jaffir's words on the occasion. "The poor of my country used to get
 " their bread by trading in salt, beetle-nut,
 " and tobacco, which the English have now
 " taken to themselves; by which my poor are
 " starving, my revenues ruined, and no ad-
 " vantage to the company."||

I can add nothing to these words, which can shew the impropriety and illegality of this trade in a stronger light; but the evil was not now to be checked. Had Mr. Vansittart set the example of self-denial, (which was more immediately his duty, as well from the rank he bore, as in gratitude to his employers, from whom he, at this time, received near 20,000*l.* sterling per annum) it might have been prevented; but, although he was so great a master of the reasons against it, yet he, together with almost all the agents of the company, have now a great part of their fortunes embarked in it; and must, therefore, either support the measure, or give up the prospect of the vast fortunes they expected to acquire in it.

Mr. Vansittart, who foresaw the violent disputes this was like to bring on, thought to prevent it by going himself to the subah at Mongheer,

|| This is taken from a remonstrance from Meer Jaffir, 1766.

gheer, where he entered into certain articles for the conducting this trade; but the remedy proved worse than the disease; for it submitted the subjects of the company to the jurisdiction of the subah's courts; a most inexcusable error in any man, who had resided only a month in that country, in which space of time he could not have failed of learning, that in them bribery prevails to the utter exclusion of justice. Neither did the difference of paying 2 and a half or 9 per cent. tend any ways to remove the injuries occasioned by this oppressive trade: it was with respect to the natives, (who never could carry salt the distance of Patna without paying from 30 to 40 per cent.) as much a monopoly as ever.

The subah deemed this concession a complete victory, and determined to put an end to the English influence throughout the country: The orders he issued on this occasion were drawn up in a triumphant stile; and his officers and subjects, long oppressed by the superior power of the English, thought this the time to take their revenge, by the most injurious oppressive behaviour, which they undoubtedly thought would be agreeable to their master. These were retaliated, and a war seemed inevitable: but that a war was not the object that the council sought for, is past a doubt, or Mr. Amyatt would not have offered himself to go on a deputation to negotiate with Meer Cossim (what he thought) a peace, though most absurdly so; for, to insist upon carrying on the inland trade, paying 2 and a half per cent, was the same, in effect,

effect, as insisting upon the subah's consent to the ruin of himself and all his subjects, which he was so far from intending, that, it is evident to me, he had already determined on a war.

Mr. Vansittart had laid it down as an invariable maxim, to strengthen and support the subah's government to the utmost of his power: he placed an entire confidence in him, and kept up no sort of connection with any one in his court or dominions. So perfect a confidence in a man from whom he had wrested three rich provinces, implies a want of judgment, very unaccountable in a man of Mr. Vansittart's abilities, his experience on the coast of Coromandel never taught him such a principle; for tho' Mahmud Ally is, perhaps, one of the best Mahometans who ever governed in India, yet we never extended our confidence in him so far, as to trust him with the whole power of his country uncontrouled; but have always garrisoned his forts with our own troops. Whatever Mr. Vansittart's views or motives might have been, Meer Cossim well knew how to avail himself of them, of which he soon gave an instance, which will for ever be remembered, to our dishonour in that country.

I have, in the beginning of these observations, mentioned the protection solemnly promised by lord Clive to Jaggutseat: His cousin, Seeroopehand was his equal in the house; their families lived together, and it was with them an invariable rule never to suffer the two to go out at the same time; nor did one ever take out his own children, but the children of the other:

These rules were established, as well for security against each other, as against the government. About this period Meer Cossim sent for both the seats to Mongheer: I am told they secretly claimed our protection; if they did not, it could only arise from the little expectation they could have of obtaining it, after the disregard we had shewn to Ramnaran. Upon the principle which Mr. Vansittart had laid down, viz, "that the subah was master of his subjects, and that we had no right to interfere between them," they were abandoned, and obliged to attend the summons: they were both put under confinement; and, upon the subah's ill success, both put to an ignominious death. And thus the measure of our infidelity was completed, to all with whom we had entered into any engagement.

Whilst the subah thus undetermined our strength, by shewing to his subjects the fatal consequences of engaging with the English, he was secretly advancing his own by forming unknown to us, the most formidable and best completed army that had ever been seen in that country; and though Mr. Vansittart had often heard reports to this effect, he gave no sort of credit to them, but treated them as artifices of his adversaries to bring on a rupture. A more masterly stroke of policy in Meer Cossim was his continually debauching our sepoy's from us; and for these arts he was beholden to his Armenian ministers, a set of people whom Mr. Vansittart should not have suffered either about him-

himself or the subah, who betrayed our councils and urged on the war.

Meer Cossim was himself a coward, and whilst Mr. Amyatt was with him, I imagine his mind often fluctuated between peace and war. He determined for the last, as appears by Mr. Amyatt's letter of the 25th of June, 1763, a few days after he left the Nabob, wherein he says, " he and Mr. Hay both judged that he intended war, and that he would attack our troops at Patna ; that four days before an Armenian commander, with a strong reinforcement of horse and foot, went to Patna, and that the Armenians solely managed him and urged the dispute." Indeed his behaviour to Mr. Amyatt, as well as the rest of his conduct, convinced me that his resolution was taken, founded on the assurance of success his Armenian ministers gave him. If this had not been his determination, Meer Cossim had sense enough to know, and *no doubt Mr. V. assured him he would certainly be redressed from England.* Other proofs are since come from General Carnac to his friends, copies of the orders for the attack of Mr. Ellis, and the massacre of the English ; so that had not Mr. Ellis attacked the city as he did, he would probably have been himself attacked the following day. The preparations the subah had made, clearly prove his intentions ; for forces were already detached into Bengal, and the war began in all parts almost in the same moment.

If the word of an Armenian may be admitted as authority, I have before me a letter from

a gentleman in council at Calcutta, a man of very fair character, wherein he mentions what the brother of the subah's prime minister told him, viz. "Sir you just hit the critical time; a few months delay would have overset you, and stripped you of every privilege and possession in that country." The same gentleman says, this I firmly believe, "Had we not begun with him, he would with us, whenever his forces were brought into that regularity of discipline he intended." And it is probable that, when no longer awed by us, he would have proved one of the most bloody tyrants the world ever produced; for in his retreat from the country, he put to death not only all the English prisoners in his hands, but also the seats, with many marks of ignominy and cruelty; Ramnaran, with nine of his family; Rajahbullub and his son, and every man of rank or substance in his power, though he could not possibly derive any advantage from it.

Lord Clive, by a strict adherence to every engagement he had entered into, had established such a national reputation, that I am convinced there was not a man in the three provinces, who would not have joined the English forces on a single letter: but the giving up the persons of Ramnaran and the seats into the subah's power, had so totally changed their sentiments of us, that English faith was now as much detested as it was before respected; and although Meer Cossim fought several battles, and in each drew nearer to his ruin, not a single man joined us to the last.

to Mr. V. throughout his book imputes it to his adversaries, that from the beginning they were determined to restore Meer Jaffir, though they constantly denied it to their most intimate friends, and wrote, that though they disapproved of the revolution, which placed Meer Cossim in the subahship, they thought it their duty not to involve the company in another war. They also disapproved the subah's being permitted to reside 200 miles from his capital, without any one on our part to watch his actions, which they were told (and the issue proved it true) tended all to preparations for war, and, they believed against us. The giving up Ramnaran and the seats was another measure they could by no means approve of; and had the army taken the field the moment Ramnaran was put in irons, or the seats confined, the war had been much more justifiable than in the support of privileges, to which they had no right.

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THE restoring Jaffir Ally Cawn to the subahship was the necessary consequence of the war against Cossim Ally Cawn, and the conditions on which he was to be restored were, besides the confirmation of former treaties,

That he should maintain twelve thousand horse and twelve thousand foot, which number should not be exceeded without the consent of the company, that he should permit a constant resident at his court, on behalf of the company.

That the orders issued by Cossim Ally Cawn, declaring all trade exempt from customs for two years, should be reversed, and the English permitted to trade free of duty on all commodities except salt, which should pay two and a half *per cent*.

Thirty laacks of rupees to be paid to the company, to defray their losses and expences in the war.

All private persons, inhabitants of Calcutta, to be reimbursed such losses as they should prove before the governor and council; besides this public treaty, there were the following separate articles, which are not entered on the records.

That twenty-five laacks should be paid to the army for their services, and half that sum to the navy.

The war was carried on with such success against Cossim Ally, that he was soon driven out of his dominions, and implored the protection of Sujah Dowla, the soubah of the next province; who, on hearing Cossim Ally had entered his dominions with a considerable force,

force, which still remained attached to him, thought it proper to move towards the Bengal frontier ; when having made Cossim Ally dismiss his troops, and probably having taken a considerable share of his treasures, he then solemnly took him under his protection.

It does not appear Sujah Dowla had at this time any intention of invading the Bengal provinces, but our success against Cossim Ally was followed by a mutiny among our troops, at the instigation of some French men in our service ; a battalion of sepoys, and about two hundred Europeans (mostly foreigners) marched off to the enemy, with their arms, colours, and two field pieces, and the rest were with difficulty restrained from following them.

Flattered by these circumstances of our distress, Sujah Dowla seemed to assure himself of an easy conquest of the three provinces, which he immediately invaded. General Carnac, who at this time commanded our army, wisely declined hazarding an action : as the mutinous spirit in the army was not yet reduced, he stood on the defensive, and always repulsed the enemy and covered Patna, till the rains put an end to all operations. General Carnac being soon after dismissed from the service by orders from England, the command devolved on major Munro, who, by a well-timed severity, reduced the army to obedience ; took the field and gain'd the important battle of Buxar.

Affairs in Calcutta were pushed with as much vigour as in the field; Mir Jassir was extremely pressed for payment of the several demands on him,

him. The expence of the army was enormous, for we did not now fight our battles with a handful of men as at Plassy in 1757. The military establishment had been annually encreasing ever since lord Clive left the country, and now consisted of 18000 horse and foot, the expence of which soon swallowed up the thirty laacks paid by Meer Jaffir; as also the further sum of five laacks *per* month, which Mir Jaffir had agreed to pay while the war lasted; and the company were sinking from forty to fifty thousand pounds every month of their capital: besides the maintaining the war at this immense expence, Meer Jaffir was closely pressed for the vast sums to be paid on private accounts.

The article of the treaty stipulating an indemnification for private losses, proved a source of the most dishonourable oppression. Meer Jaffir was first assured the losses would not amount to more than ten laacks, on the faith of which he consented to make them good; he was soon after told it would be twenty, then thirty, then forty, and was finally fixed at fifty-three laacks, or 700,000*l.* of which seven-eighths was for losses sustained (or said to be sustained) in an illicit monopoly of the necessities of life, carried on against the orders of the company, and to the utter ruin of many thousands of the India merchants: That we may not lose the sight of the English conduct in this, I shall here bring this subject to a conclusion, by informing the reader, that the court of directors being justly alarmed at the fatal consequences they apprehended from this trade, had under

date

date, the 8th of February 1764, most positively ordered their servants to put a total and effectual stop to the inland trade, in salt. Mr. Vansittart and his council met to debate on this order, and came to a resolution to carry it on, paying two and a half *per cent*. Mr. Vansittart is pleased to urge, contradictory orders were then arrived, or soon expected. Mr. Vansittart mistakes both in dates and facts. Four months after the above order, the court of directors, conformable to an order of a general court, informed their agents at Bengal, that lord Clive and the select committee would have powers to regulate the inland trade, meaning to regulate it so, that it should neither be oppressive to the natives nor hurtful to the Nabob's revenue; but this letter was not received nor known of at that period of time when the above resolution was agreed to.

To return to the demands made upon Meer Jassir. The twenty-five laacks, stipulated for the army, were nearly discharged, but all delicacy of conduct was laid aside, in the manner in which payment was obtained for the 700,000 l. for private losses, half of which was soon extorted from him, tho' the company were at that time sinking under the burthen of the war, and obliged to borrow great sums of money of their servants at eight *per cent*. interest; and even with that assistance could not carry on both their war and their investment, but sent their ships half loaded to Europe.

When advice was received of lord Clive's departure from England, the persecution of Meer Jaffir for payment of the several demands on him held pace with their fears of lord Clive's disapprobation of their conduct, and I make no doubt that the indignities he suffered hastened his death, by bringing on a bad state of health, which ended in a dropfy, of which he died two months after Mr. Vansittart left the country.

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